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Introduction
American agriculture is once again confronted with the 
problem of excess capacity.1 Surplus stocks of grain have 
continued to rise despite government efforts to limit supply and 
to encourage use. Government support costs also have risen 
dramatically since 1980. Annual set-aside programs have failed to 
eliminate the surpluses and the costs of attracting participation 
continue at high levels.
The 1985 farm bill contained various provisions designed to 
address problems of excess capacity. These included lowering 
support prices, introducing export subsidies, and initiating a 
new Conservation Reserve Program. Many observers believe that 
more emphasis over the next few years will have to be placed on 
long-range land retirement schemes to achieve the required 
adjustments in production at less cost. If these schemes are 
targeted to vulnerable land, such as with the current conserva­
tion reserve, they might also help to reduce soil erosion.
The pages which follow summarize the results of a study, 
completed in October, 1985 (before passage of the 1985 Farm 
Security Act), that assessed the economic consequences of 
implementing a long-range land retirement program designed to 
eliminate wheat surpluses [Jagger (a)]. The principal objectives 
of such a program would be to reduce support costs, to encourage 
more permanent adjustments in wheat production, and to reduce 
potential soil losses. *1
* Agricultural economist, Economic Research Service, U. S. 
Department of Agriculture and Professor, Department of Agricul­
tural Economics, Cornell University, respectively. The authors 
would like to thank Bernard F. Stanton and Nelson L. Bills for 
their comments and suggestions, and Judy Watkins for her assis­
tance in preparing the manuscript for publication.
1 Jagger (a) provides a discussion of excess capacity 
concepts in the context of the U. S. wheat sector [pp. 17-40] . Robinson, 1986, discusses factors underlying current excess capacity in U. S. agriculture and alternative policy instruments for coping with it.
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A feature which makes this study different from other 
studies of long range land retirement is that equity problems 
related to tenants are analyzed. A new system to partition 
benefits between landowners and tenants is proposed.
The paper is organized as follows: first, theoretical 
reasons why program costs could be reduced under a long range program are developed. Second, the elements of a proposed program 
are outlined. Third, the costs of retiring varying amounts of 
wheat land in the Great Plains region are estimated. Areas within 
the region where participation in the proposed program would most 
likely occur also are identified. Fourth, the profitability of 
participating in a long-range land retirement scheme is compared 
with returns from participating in current annual acreage 
diversion programs. The relative effects on owner-operators, 
landlords and tenants are assessed. Fifth, the feasibility and 
potential effects on production of targeting land retirement to 
achieve conservation objectives (i.e. a program similar to the 
adopted conservation reserve) are explored. Sixth, limitations of 
the analysis are discussed. In the concluding section, the 
problems and trade-offs inherent in implementing the proposed program are identified.
Why Program Costs Could Be Reduced Under
A Long-Range Land Retirement Program
In theory, the cost of achieving a given level of adjustment 
in production will be less under a long-range land retirement 
scheme than under annual acreage diversion programs whose 
provisions or existence may change from year to year. Without 
guarantees that annual programs will be offered in the future or 
that provisions will be acceptable, farmers are reluctant to make 
the long-range adjustments in their capital and labor that would 
lead to lower levels of production. Thus, payments under a 
voluntary annual program must be sufficient to compensate them 
for what they would have earned if they had not temporarily idled 
their equipment and labor and if their diverted acres had been 
planted to the program crop [Robinson, 1966]. With the program 
guarantees of a long-range program, farmers can safely adjust 
their capital and labor to reduce production. This lowers 
farmers' costs of program participation which should then reduce 
government costs as well.
In practice, a long range land retirement program provides 
an opportunity to reduce program costs by modifying provisions 
relating to tenant compensation. Current annual programs 
partition benefits between landlords and tenants according to 
crop shares. This partitioning is appropriate for annual 
programs because part-owners and tenants under-employ their labor 
and capital, as do owner-operators. Under a long-term program,
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there is less justification for compensating tenants on a 
continuing basis because they may have the option of renting 
other land or selling their equipment and accepting alternative 
employment. Tenants would be adversely affected by a long-range 
land retirement program, however, and for this reason, a compell­
ing case can be made for offering them some compensation. Such 
compensation need not be for the full term of the contract or 
equivalent to that offered under current annual programs. 
Reducing the level of tenant compensation would reduce program 
costs. Ways to accomplish this in an equitable fashion are discussed below.
Conceptually, land compensation should be the major com­
ponent of program costs if acreage targets are low enough to be 
met by participating non-operator landlords and owner-operators 
with alternative uses for their labor, buildings, and equipment. 
Given the large amount of cropland already rented in the United 
States, it should be possible to idle substantial areas of land 
under long-term contracts at a cost per acre not much above current land rental rates.
This point is illustrated for the Great Plains in Table 1. 
According to estimates from the 1982 Census of Agriculture, over 
70 percent of the total area devoted to crops in the Great Plains 
is now farmed by part-owners or tenants.2 Rented land accounts 
for 40 percent or more of all crop acres in five of the eight principal wheat producing states in the region.
Table 1. Proportion of Harvested Cropland Acres Rented or Farmed 
by Part-owners and Tenants, Eight Great Plains States, 1982
Proportion of Crop Acres:
Farmed by Rented by
Part-Owners Part-Owners
and Tenants_________ and Tenants
Colorado 71 33Kansas 80 49Montana 73 27Nebraska 76 27North Dakota 80 48Oklahoma 75 40South Dakota 76 40Texas 75 42
Source: Estimated procedure outlined infrom the 1982 Jagger (a), p. Census126. of Agriculture by a
2 Part-owners own some land and rent additional land to make more effective use of their labor and equipment.
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Guidelines for a Long-Range 
Land Retirement Program
The following program guidelines are designed to provide 
equitable treatment to tenants, to protect local communities and 
agribusiness firms from adverse impacts, and to reduce program 
costs relative to current annual programs.
1. Participation is voluntary. Rhetoric to the contrary, 
neither farmers nor Congress appear eager to return to the kinds 
of mandatory commodity programs that were in effect during the 
1950s.3 Mandatory programs did not restrict production suf­
ficiently to solve overproduction problems [Paarlberg, pp. 213- 
217] . The programs did, however, restrict farmers sufficiently 
that farmers voted them down [Hadwiger and Talbot].
2. Landowners decide whether or not to enter the program. 
Despite the sizable proportion of land farmed by tenants, 
decisions on entry of land into the program should be based on 
negotiations between the landowner and the government. Inclusion 
of tenants in this decision would complicate the process. 
Tenants should be afforded all the protection that they normally 
receive in dealings with landowners and leases must be enforced 
but tenants should not have the power to withhold participation.
3. Contracts for retiring cropland are for a ten year 
period. Establishing the term length of long range contracts 
involves trade-offs. A longer term provides more stability for 
both participants and the government„ It allows fixed costs of 
establishing cover and tenant compensation to be spread over more 
years. A shorter term allows policymakers to re-evaluate program 
performance more often--an advantage given uncertain commodity 
markets.
4. A participant can retire either all or part of the farm. 
No premiums will be paid for whole farm participation. Contrary 
to conclusions in much of the policy literature [Brandow], whole 
farm land retirement will probably not be cheaper nor incur less 
slippage than part-farm retirement. Some land will be retired at 
the land rental cost under either a whole farm or part farm long­
term program; some land will require additional compensation—  
especially if rented land is allowed into a program and tenants
3 A survey by Guither et al. found that only a minority of 
wheat producers favored mandatory production controls. In the 
1986 non-binding wheat referendum a small majority of wheat 
producers voted in favor of mandatory production controls. Only 
one-fourth of eligible producers voted in the referendum, 
however, a substantially lower proportion than voted on binding 
wheat referendums of the 1950s and 1960s.
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are compensated. Slippage is a problem under either type of 
program. For a program targeted to certain crops, a whole farm 
program may cause greater slippage if payments are made for 
retiring all crop acres. Under both types of programs, produc­
tion may be intensified on other farms [Jagger (b)].
5• Both tenants and landowners receive program benefits. 
Landowners receive annual payments for retiring cropland and for 
establishing and maintaining conservation practices. Tenants 
receive a one-time payment to compensate for the enterprise 
adjustments they are forced to make. Owner-operators putting 
land in the program receive both landlord and tenant payments.
§ To bring land into a voluntary land retirement program, 
sufficient incentives for the landowner must be provided. Tenants 
have an investment in the land they farm, though. Loss of part of 
that land may require farm reorganization; shifting to other land 
may increase costs. Current annual program benefits are shared 
between landowners and tenants according to their normal contri­
bution to production. Because a tenant's contribution in a long- 
range program is negligible, a one-time payment to compensate 
tenants for adjustments they are forced to make is appropriate.
. ^  t— administrators solicit bids from landownerswanting to participate in the program. Bids are in the form of a 
payment rate per bushel of established yield for the land to be 
retired. It is assumed that land with the lowest bids will be 
accepted for the program subject to limits on the total amount of land to be retired in a given area.
Economists have argued that bid programs, where the govern- 
ment accepts or rejects bids from farmers, are more efficient 
than flat rate offer programs, where the government sets a rate 
and farmers choose whether or not to enter the program [Rudd, pp. 
72-73]. This conclusion is based on the assumption that some farmers will be prepared to offer their land at lower prices than 
the offer rate. Theoretically, unearned rent would be eliminated under a bid program, thus lowering program costs. ■
7 • Tenant— compensation payments are calculated as a per­centage— of— payments_to landowners. This percentage would be
specified by Congress. Setting tenant compensation at a per­
centage of landowner compensation would simplify program formula- 
tion and administration. Congress is the proper forum for
determining this percentage because it routinely handles eguitv issues. J
8 * Annual commodity.program crop bases for all farms of alandowner— are— fixed_as of the reserve contract date. Partici-
pants in the reserve program are prohibited from increasing the 
area planted to program crops on all farms. Sodbuster provisions
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would apply, thus limiting the conversion of fragile grasslands 
to cropland.
A land retirement program will be less effective in reducing 
output if the cropland base is expanded. Under a voluntary 
program, expansion by non-participants cannot be stopped but 
expansion on other farms of participants can be. Because the 
proposed program explicitly focuses program responsibility on 
landowners, this provision can be imposed on landowners with 
multiple tenants. Sodbuster provisions are designed to discour­
age planting on vulnerable land.
9. Grazing is permitted on program land. Having would be 
allowed only under special circumstances as determined by the 
Secretary of Agriculture. Allowing the use of program land for 
grazing or alternative uses is justified for two reasons. First, 
farmers may reduce program bids to reflect earnings from alterna­
tive enterprises. This would reduce program costs. Second, 
farmers may keep land out of crop production after contracts 
expire because they have reorganized their operation around the 
alternative enterprises.
10. Limits are imposed on the percentages of total cropland 
and tenant operated cropland that could be accepted in the 
program in each county. Such restrictions are designed to limit 
the impact on the local economy and to minimize potential adverse 
effects on tenants.
11. Reserve payments stop at the end of the contract period. 
Phased re-entrv of land into production occurs whenever the ratio 
of ending wheat stocks to production falls below a target level 
specified bv Congress. If stocks decline and prices rise, some 
long range "reserve" land may be needed to increase production 
before the end of the contract period. An early release mechanism 
should be specified in advance and based on an automatic formula 
not subj ect to discretionary administrative decisions. The 
release formula should be spelled out by Congress.
Phased re-entry prevents short run over-reaction to per­
ceived market signals, reduces demand pressure on farm input 
markets, and preserves conservation investments. A stock related 
release mechanism avoids some of the problems associated with 
price related mechanisms. Problems of price-related mechanism are 
related to inflation and exchange rate fluctuations, price and 
income support programs, and data collection procedures [Jagger 
(a), pp. 110-116]
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Estimated Cost of Retiring Wheat 
Land in the Great Plains
In this section, the costs of implementing a ten year land 
retirement program targeted to wheat acres in the Great Plains 
are estimated. These estimates are based on the preceding 
guidelines. There are two major types of program costs associated 
with program payments to farmers: land compensation and non-land 
compensation. Non-land compensation includes both tenant compen­
sation and other program costs (see below). Tenant compensation 
is assumed to be a percentage of land costs.
Estimation Procedures
Program land costs are assumed to equal current cash rents. 
To reduce output at least cost, land should be retired in areas 
where the land rent per bushel of yield is the lowest. Average 
and marginal costs of retiring a given quantity of land can be 
estimated by constructing a cost curve showing the average cash rental rate per bushel of wheat as higher-cost land is brought into the program.
To identify the least-cost pattern of land retirement, 
annual rental rates per acre had to be converted into an average 
land cost per bushel by dividing prevailing rental rates by 
average yields. Ideally, one would like to know the yield and 
current rental rate for each region, grade or type of land, but, 
unfortunately, such data are not available even by counties. One 
has to rely on regional ' data and average yields for areas that 
encompass varying types or qualities of land.
Land Rental Rates. Estimates of average rental rates are 
available for NASS (National Agricultural Statistics Service, 
formerly, Statistical Research Service) crop reporting districts. 
Such districts consist of several adjacent counties. Unpublished 
data for 1984 on cash rental rates for two categories of cropland 
(irrigated and non-irrigated) were obtained for all crop report­ing districts in the Great Plains region.
Although much of the wheat acreage is rented on shares, cash 
rent was used in the analysis of costs. This was done for two 
reasons. First, cash rental data are more readily available. 
The level of share rents is a function of input and output prices 
and yields. Data for all of these variables are not available for 
all districts. Second, cash renting rather than share renting is 
a strategy which likely appeals to risk averse landowners. A 
government land retirement program is likely to appeal also to 
risk averse landowners. Thus, cash rents may reflect more 
accurately the preferences of likely participants in a land retirement program.
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One problem with the NASS cash rent data is that NASS 
statisticians in most states question the statistical reliability 
of data at the crop reporting district level. They consider the 
sample size within each district to be too small. Such data, 
however, appeared to be the best available and consequently were 
used to make the cost calculations.
Another problem is that NASS cash rent data reflect rates 
prevailing for all types of cropland and all crops. To determine 
the rental cost per bushel of wheat, it is necessary to convert 
yields from different crops for each district to equivalent wheat 
yields. The procedure used to adjust yields is described below.
Yield estimates. Separate yield data for summer fallow, 
continuously cropped and irrigated wheat production and harvested 
acreage for the crop years 1981 through 1983 were obtained from 
NASS. From these data, the three year average wheat yield was 
calculated for each cropping practice. The average yield 
probably is biased upward slightly as poorer continuously cropped 
land likely was retired from production under the 1982 and 1983 wheat diversion programs.
A weighting system for yields was devised to reflect current 
patterns of land use and land qualities. The weights attached to 
yield estimates were derived from reports of the harvested acres 
of important crops in each crop reporting district. Census data 
relative to irrigated land were used to supplement the informa­tion provided by NASS.
Average yields were calculated for four categories of land 
use: fallow, two types of continuously cropped dryland, and 
irrigated land. For fallow land, the yield estimate was based on 
average wheat yields reported for fallow wheat for 1981 through 
1983. Dryland I yields were based on the same three year average 
yield for continuously cropped wheat. Dryland II yields (assumed 
to be those prevailing on more productive land) were estimated to 
be 115 percent of the average yields for Dryland I wheat. 
Irrigated wheat yields were based on the average yields reported 
for such land for 1981 through 1983. Weighted average yields for 
non-irrigated land in each district were obtained by multiplying 
average yields for each category of land by the proportion of 
dryland represented by each category in that district.
Land Cost per Bushel of Production. Average land costs per 
bushel were estimated separately for irrigated and non-irrigated 
land in each district. Prevailing cash rental rates were divided 
by the adjusted (weighted) wheat yield estimated for each 
district and for each type of land. For non-irrigated land, this 
calculation was based on the proportions of continuously cropped and summer fallow land.
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Summer Fallow Acres. The treatment of fallow land in 
estimating rental costs presents special problems. To gain 
participation in the summer fallow areas, it may be necessary to 
compensate owners for fallow land as well as land that otherwise 
would be planted to wheat.4 Costs per bushel of retired produc­
tion will be higher than if no fallow compensation were paid. 
This increase in program costs may be offset by attracting more 
land in low cost areas where fallowing is common. Average land 
costs per bushel are lower in the western part of the Great 
Plains. By paying fallow compensation, more land may enter the 
program from these regions, thereby helping to hold down total program costs.
Costs were estimated under three sets of assumptions 
regarding rental rates paid for land in summer-fallow areas. 
Under the first set of assumptions, rental rates are based solely 
on the cost per bushel of land planted to wheat; no compensation 
is paid for summer fallow land. Under the second set of assump­
tions , bids are accepted on the basis of land cost per bushel of 
wheat on planted acres, but successful bidders are then compen­
sated for fallow land. This increases total program costs 
relative to the first set of assumptions but does not change the 
geographical distribution of retired cropland. Under the third 
set of assumptions, farmers are assumed to add 25 percent to land 
rental rates per bushel (calculated on the basis of yields on 
planted acreage) to compensate for fallow land.
It is not clear what procedure farmers in wheat-fallow areas 
would use in calculating their bids. Most of the empirical 
results which follow are based on the first set of assumptions, 
namely that fallow compensation is not included in land rental 
costs. This undoubtedly biases cost estimates downward.
Constructing Program Cost Curves. Crop reporting district 
land rental rates adjusted for yield are assumed to represent the 
bids which landowners would submit to the government. it was 
also assumed that a fixed proportion of wheat acres (alternative- 
ly, 30, 50, or 100 percent) was retired from each district 
entering the program. With these assumptions, cost curves were 
constructed for program land. The 30 percent cost curve is used 
for most analytical purposes because 1) assumed program guide­
lines allow only 30 percent of district land to enter the 
program, ^and 2) it would be unrealistic to assume that all land 
from a district would enter a program at prevailing average land rental rates.
4 Wheat farmers now receive benefits equivalent to fallow 
compensation. Under annual acreage diversion programs, land 
which would normally be idled for summer fallowing purposes can be used to meet conserving use acreage requirements. with such a 
provision, wheat acres are reduced but acres of other crops may 
increase. The value of this program provision is equal to the 
returns from alternative crops grown on the "summer fallow" land [Jagger (b), pp. 122-124].
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The 30 percent land rent cost curve (or program supply 
curve) is shown in Figure 1. Each step in the function repre­
sents the marginal cost of bringing in land from additional crop 
reporting districts. The incremental costs of bringing in 
additional land are small over the central range, but rise 
sharply thereafter.
Total costs obviously are a function of the magnitude of the 
adjustment required. As more land must be attracted into the 
program in order to achieve national goals, average costs per 
bushel of retired production will increase. Consequently, total 
costs at some point start to rise at an increasing rate.
Non-Land Costs. Land costs are only one element that must be 
considered. To such costs must be added tenant compensation and 
payments for establishing and maintaining cover on retired land. 
For completeness, administrative costs also should be included, 
but because there is little basis on which to estimate such 
costs, they have been omitted. Tenant compensation costs are 
based on an assumed one-time, first year payment equal to twice 
the land rental cost. Estimates of the costs of establishing 
permanent vegetative cover are based on those reported as paid by 
the U.S. Department of Agriculture in 1983 for land set aside 
under long-term Agricultural Conservation Program Agreements. An 
average per acre cost for the eight states was determined by 
weighting the per acre state cost by the proportion of total 
wheat acres in each state. The weighted average cost for the 
eight Great Plains states was $21.61 per acre [dagger, 1986, pp. 127] .
.Program Magnitude. Because estimates of the amount of excess 
capacity in wheat production are highly variable, no single 
target for land retirement was assumed. Instead, four levels of 
national acreage reduction were hypothesizedj 6, 11, 15 and 22 
million acres. The 6 million acre program was chosen arbitrarily 
as a lower bound. The 11 and 15 million acre programs represent 
the size range that Jagger (a) concluded would be appropriate for 
a long range program initiated in the mid-1980s. He noted that 
annual acreage diversion programs could be used for additional 
production adjustment as needed [pp. 40-47]. The 22 million acre 
figure is based on a USDA estimate of excess capacity published 
in 1986 [USDA, 1986]„5 These figures were multiplied by 70
5 A 22 million acre program is equivalent to setting aside 
24 percent of the 1986 base acreage for wheat (91.7 mil. acres). 
In 1986, farmers were compelled to idle 25 percent of their base 
acreage in order to qualify for loans and price-support payments. 
For the 1987 crop, the acreage reduction requirement was raised 
to 27.5 percent. Thus, a 22 million acre longer-term land 
retirement program for wheat would not differ greatly in magni­
tude from recent annual set-aside programs.
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Figure 1. Cost Per Bushel of Renting Wheat Land, Eight Great 
Plains Wheat Producing States.
* Land cost only— no tenant or fallow compensation. Assumes 
30 percent of wheat acreage by cropping practice is retired from each district entering the program.
11
percent to establish goals for retired acreage in the Great Plains of 4.2, 7.7, 10.5, and 15.4 million acres.6
Results
District Land Costs. Average land costs per bushel on 
continuously cropped wheat land for all crop reporting districts 
in the Great Plains are shown in Figure 2. Costs are coded by 10 
cent intervals. Districts coded with a 60 are those in which 
land costs are less than 70 cents per bushel; districts labeled 
with a 70 have costs ranging from 70 to 79 cents per bushel and 
so on. Calculated land costs ranged from 47 cents per bushel for 
dryland wheat in west central South Dakota to over $3 per bushel 
for some irrigated wheat land.
Estimated average land costs per bushel by crop reporting 
districts for summer fallow land, assuming fallow compensation, 
are shown in Figure 3. Several districts in Montana, South 
Dakota, Kansas and Colorado have calculated land costs of less 
than $1 per bushel even when the assumption is made that land 
owners will be compensated for fallow land.
Total Program Costs for Alternative Program Magnitudes. 
Estimated total program costs incorporating land rental costs, 
payments for establishing permanent cover and tenant compensation 
are summarized in Table 2. The underlying assumptions are that 
30 percent of all wheat land in low-cost districts is placed in 
the program and that no fallow compensation is paid. Costs have 
been estimated for the Great Plains based on 4 levels of program 
size. First year costs include an allowance for tenant compensa­
tion and for establishing permanent cover; subsequent annual 
costs (years 2 to 10) are based solely on estimated land rental 
costs. Average annual costs over the 10 year period are indi­
cated in the last column.
First year costs rival those incurred under current annual 
programs; however, costs for subsequent years are much lower. 
The average annual cost per acre for the 10 year period would 
amount to about $28 per acre for a 4 million acre program, a bit 
over $30 per acre for an 8 million acre program, and around $40 
per acre for a 15 million acre program. Doubling the target 
acreage from 7.7 to 15.4 million acres more than doubles the 
total cost because per acre costs rise by 29 percent. If fallow 
compensation were to be paid, costs obviously would be somewhat 
higher.
6 In the early 1980s, wheat growers in the Great Plains 
accounted for approximately 65 percent of harvested wheat acreage 
and 60 percent of total production. If double-cropped wheat in 
the southeast is excluded on the assumption that it will be 
cheaper to purchase the required adjustments in other areas, the 
proportion of the national targeted acreage allocated to the Great Plains would amount to around 70 percent.
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Figure 2. Land Rental Cost Per Bushel of Wheat Production. 
Continuously Cropped Land by District.
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Figure 3. Land Rental Cost Per Bushel of Wheat Production.
Summer Fallowed Land by District. Fallow Compensation Incorporated into Bids.
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Table 2. Annual Program Costs Incorporating Land Rental Costs,Payments for 
Compensation* Establishing Permanent Cover, and Tenant
Annual CostProgram Production Average,Size Adjustment Year 1 Year 2-10 Year 1-10
f m i  1 r’Y ’ss et ^ (mi 1 Thu \ "““million collars-
4.2 126 364 91 118
7.7 227 709 181 234
10.5 317 1034 269 346
15.4 485 1758 475 603
* Assumes 30 percent of wheat acreage by cropping practice is 
retired from each district entering the program and that no 
fallow compensation is paid. Costs of establishing permanent cover are based on the eight state weighted average.
CQfts_of_a 15.4 million Acre Program Under Alternative
Assumptions. The magnitude of changes in total program and per 
acre costs that might be anticipated under different assumptions 
regarding fallow and tenant compensation and the proportion of 
acreage retired from each district entering the program are 
indicated in Table 3. The figures are based on a 15.4 million acre program.
If fallow and tenant compensation payments were made, for example, total program costs would exceed land rental costs by 
$100  ^million, i.e. total program costs would rise from $339 
million to $4 3 8 million for a 15.4 million acre program. This 
assumes that 100 percent of wheat-related land is retired from 
each low cost district entering the program. When it is assumed 
that only 3 0 percent of the land is retired from each district 
entering the program, total program costs would rise by more than 
$100 million if payments for tenants and fallow compensation were 
added to land rental costs. Comparable figures for a 7.7 million acre program are shown in Appendix A.
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Table 3. Total Program Cost and Per Acre Costs of a 15.4 Million 
Acre Program Under Alternative Assumptions Regarding 
Acreage Restrictions, Fallow and Tenant Compensation*
Percent of
Average Annual District
Program Cost Production Acres 25% Fallow Tenant
Total Per Acre Adjustment Retired** Compensation Compensation
(mil.$) (S/A) (mil. bu.)
339 22.04 463 100 no no
365 23.71 435 100 yes no
380 24.70 460 50 no no
407 26.45 464 100 no yes
438 28.45 435 100 yes yes
439 28.53 473 50 yes no
456 29.64 460 50 no yes
475 30.83 485 30 no no
516 33.53 484 30 yes no
527 34.23 473 50 yes yes
570 36.99 485 30 no yes
620 40.24 484 30 yes yes
* Total program cost excludes costs of establishing and maintaining cover crops and administrative costs.
** Percentage of wheat acreage by cropping practice assumed 
retired from each district entering the program.
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An—Ofjfgr_vs_. a Bid System. The conventional analysis of the 
difference in costs between a flat rate offer system and a bid 
system is based on a program supply curve similar to Figure 1 
(except the vertical axis represents per acre rather than per 
bushel costs). Program land costs under a flat rate offer system 
are assumed to equal the area under a horizontal line drawn from 
the marginal acre on the supply curve to the vertical axis (the 
average cost per acre of retiring land is equal to the marginal 
cost of the last acre retired) . Program land costs under a bid 
system are assumed to equal the area under the program supply 
curve between the marginal acre and the origin (the incremental 
cost rises as more acres are retired, but the average cost for all acres retired is less than the marginal cost) . The area 
below the horizontal line and above the program supply curve is 
assumed to represent the difference in costs between the bid system and the offer system for the same size program.
Based on these principles, program costs were compared under 
a bid and offer system for a 10.5 million acre program. Assuming 
30 percent of wheat acres are retired in each district entering 
the program and no fallow compensation is paid, total costs would 
amount to $317 million under an offer system and $269 million 
under a bid system. The marginal cost per acre would be $3 0.19 
under both systems. The average cost per acre would also be
$30.19 for the offer system but would be $25.58 for the bid system.
The difference between costs of a bid system and an offer system will change according to the program size and program 
assumptions. Percent increases in total program costs associated 
with shifting to an offer rather than a bid system (assuming tenant compensation) are shown in Table 4 .
Tabie 4. Percent Increase in Cost Under an Offer Rather Than a Bid System*
Percent Increase Over Bid System With 
Tenant Compensation
(mil. acres)
4.2 8
7.7 17
tooH 18
15.4 66
* Assumes 30 percent of wheat acreage by cropping practice is
retired from each district entering the program and that no fallow compensation is paid.
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Geographical Distribution of Retired Land
The foregoing average district land costs per bushel were 
used to determine where land might be retired under successively 
larger programs, assuming land in low-cost districts is retired 
first. Figure 4 shows the geographical distribution of retired 
land that is continuously cropped when 30 percent of the land is 
retired from each district entering the program and no fallow 
compensation is paid.7 Continuously cropped wheat land in 
western South Dakota and eastern Colorado would enter a program 
first. Irrigated land in northwest Nebraska would be the last to 
enter a program.
The geographical distribution of idle land changes when 
fallow compensation is incorporated into bids (Figure 5); 
continuously cropped land from other areas is relatively cheaper 
and fallow acres are ranked lower in the sequence of bids. For 
example, when no fallow compensation is paid, continuously 
cropped land in the north-central and south-central Kansas 
districts would not enter a program targeting 7.7 million acres 
of wheat land. Land from these districts would enter a 7.7 
million acre program when fallow compensation is paid.
When an upper limit of 30 percent of all crop land is 
imposed, land from almost all crop reporting districts in the 
Great Plains would enter a 15.4 million acre program. Large areas 
of wheat land are idled in Colorado, South Dakota and Texas even 
with a modest 4.2 million acre program.
The foregoing analysis is based on average rental rates and 
yields for each crop reporting district. Obviously there are 
substantial differences within districts as well as between 
districts in both yields and rental rates. For this reason, one 
would likely find some land owners willing to enter into a 
longer-term land retirement scheme at relatively low payment 
rates even in districts where average land costs per bushel of 
wheat yield are relatively high.
In the absence of restrictions on the proportion of land 
that can be idled in any one county or district, one might expect 
a higher proportion of land to be retired in districts with low 
average costs per bushel of wheat. The 30 percent limit not only 
simplifies the analysis but reflects similar restrictions adopted 
for the 1986 conservation reserve. Under a 30 percent limit, the 
regional impact of a long range program would differ little from 
that recently experienced under annual acreage diversion pro­
grams . Local communities and agribusiness firms in areas of high 
participation in annual programs have had to contend with annual 
acreage diversion or set-aside requirements for wheat of nearly 
this order of magnitude since 1983.
7 Maps showing the geographical distribution of retired 
fallow and irrigated land can be found in Jagger (a), pp. 140-145.
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Figure 4. Geographical Distribution of Continuously Cropped Wheat 
Acres Idled, Assuming Varying Program Levels and No Fallow Compensation.*
* Also assumes that 30 percent of land is idled in each district.
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Figure 5. Geographical Distribution of Continuously Cropped Wheat 
Acres Idled, Assuming Varying Program Levels and Fallow 
Compensation.*
* Also assumes that 30 percent of land is idled in each district.
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Relative Returns from Participating in a 
Long-Range Land Retirement Scheme vs. 
Current Annual Set-Aside Programs
Farm operators not wanting to retire will have little 
incentive to participate in a long range land retirement scheme 
if returns from signing up under such a program are less than 
they would earn if they continue to grow wheat and participate in 
annual acreage reduction programs. With low participation, much 
of the saving that could be accomplished by a long-range land 
retirement program will not be realized. In order to assess the 
profitability of a ten year land retirement scheme relative to 
annual support programs, typical farm budgets for owner-opera- 
tors, tenants, and landowners were constructed based on farm 
management data for continuously cropped wheat in north central Kansas.
The benefits of participation for tenants and owner- 
operators depend on annual program benefits and provisions, the 
"type of participation, machinery salvage values, and of f—farm 
employment opportunities. Those with land to rent are indif­
ferent to program participation because program payments from the 
government are assumed to be equivalent to their cash returns from renting to tenants.
Estimation Procedures
For those choosing to place part of their land in the 
program, the annual gain or loss from program participation can 
be measured by subtracting returns above non-land cash costs 
under an annual program from payments under a long-run program 
The net present value (NFV) of program gains and losses over the 
ten year contract period measures the benefits to farmers of 
participating in a long run program. These benefits were 
calculated with and without returns from alternative off-farm employment. For those choosing to quit farming and to place all 
of their land in the program, salvage value from sale of 
machinery must be added to first year program payments in the NPV determination.
Costs.^Cost estimates were based on 1984 production costs. 
All production costs except one-third of the fertilizer cost were 
assumed to be borne by tenants. Owner-operators were assumed to pay all production costs.
 ^Returns. Several different scenarios for returns were 
examined. The baseline scenario incorporated price and diversion provision3 from the 1985 wheat program. A second scenario reduced 
the loan rate and diversion ^ payment by ten percent while main­
taining the 1985 target price and diversion requirements. A
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third scenario eliminated the loan rate, target price, and 
diversion requirement and hypothes i z ed a lower market price. 
Returns are sensitive to variations in yields. The first three 
scenarios assumed a 32 bushel yield. A fourth scenario used price 
and diversion provisions from the 1985 wheat program but assumed 
a 25 bushel yield.
Program payments. The program land payment was set equal to 
land rent. Land rent was assumed to be one-third of gross 
receipts less one third of the fertilizer cost. Tenant compensa­
tion was assumed to be a one-time payment of twice the land rent. 
Owner-operators were assumed to receive both landowner and tenant 
payments.
Discount Rate. A discount rate of 6 percent was used for the 
net present value determination. The 6 percent rate represents 
the real interest rate for land used in the Kansas crop budgets.
Machinery Salvage Value. For a farmer placing all of his 
land into a long-run program, a machinery salvage value of $100 
per acre was added to the first year program payment— -a 20 
percent reduction from the $125 per acre depreciation expense 
used in the Kansas budgets. This deduction was made to reflect 
weak used machinery markets.
Off-farm employment. Returns from off-farm alternative 
employment were assumed to be equivalent to the implicit per acre 
value of farm labor from the Kansas budgets. Off-farm employment 
is not always available. Farmers - who quit farming because they 
are of retirement age would probably not seek off-farm employ­
ment .
Results
The most important conclusion from this budget analysis is 
that owner-operators not wanting to retire would have little 
incentive to participate in the proposed long range program given 
annual program provisions close to those mandated for 1986 and 
1987 by the Food Security Act of 1985. If landlords entered land 
into the long range program, tenants would be worse off unless 
they retired or found other land to rent. One way to increase 
program participation and reduce program costs would be to reduce 
annual commodity program benefits.
These conclusions are based on the assumptions and results 
presented in Tables 5, 6, and 7. Table 5 shows the price, yield, 
and acreage diversion assumptions used to establish alternative 
scenarios. All scenarios apply to continuously cropped wheat in 
central Kansas. Costs are for the 1984 crop year. Price and 
acreage diversion assumptions are based on those prevailing in 
1985. Scenarios A and D represent provisions under the 1985 
annual wheat program.
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Table 5. Alternative Support Price, Market Price, Acreage Diver- 
sion, and Yield Assumptions for the Relative Returns Analysis.
Scenario: A B C D
Market Price ($/bu.) 3.25 2.92 2.92 3.25
Loan Rate ($/bu.) 3.30 2.97 0 3.30Target Price ($/bu.) 4.38 4.38 0 4.38Diversion Rate ($/bu.) 2.70 2.43 0 2.70
Yield (bu./acre) 32 32 32 25
Acres Paid Diversion (%) 10 10 0 10Acres Unpaid Diversion (%) 20 20 0 20
. Relative returns per acre of wheat land from participation m  a long range program vs. annual programs are reported in Table 
6. The analysis is based on the alternative scenarios outlined 
m  Table 5. Returns under alternative assumptions regarding 
annual programs are indicated in the third column. Comparable 
estimates of returns under a 10-year program are shown in the 
next two columns. Differences in returns between the proposed 
ong-term program and alternative annual programs are shown in 
the last two columns.  ^ The negative figures indicate that 
benefits from participating in a 10-year land retirement program would be less than those earned by continuing to grow wheat and 
Sr ^ l ng Up under annual programs. For example, under Scenario A (1985 program provisions), a typical owner-operator would earn 
k 6 4-Per a?re over non-land cash costs by continuing to grow wheat. Under a 10-year program, first year compensation (includ- 
lng the equivalent value of tenant compensation) would amount to 
$96 per acre. Payments in subsequent years would amount to only 
f22 pfJ a^r®‘ Thus, while first-year payments would be greater than the budgeted return under recent annual programs, those in 
the remaining 9 years would be less. Landlords would be indif­
ferent because it is assumed their long-term rental bid would 
equal, the returns they now obtain from tenants. Results based on 
Scenarios B and C indicate how participation might be affected by 
a reduction m  annual program benefits. Less attractive annual 
programs would narrow the difference in returns for owner- 
operators and also would lead to lower bids by land owners, thus reducing overall program costs.8
8 Lowering support prices would eventually reduce the
magnitude of excess capacity by stimulating demand and reducing 
production._ A smaller long range program would then be appro­priate . This, too, would reduce program costs.
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Table 6. Relative Returns from a 10 and An Annual Program Under 
Yield Assumptions*
Year Land Retirement Program 
Different Program, Tenure, and
Return
Over
Long Run Program 
Annual Payment
Annual Gain From 
Loner Run Procrram
Scenario
(a)
Non-Land 
Cash Cost
(b)
Year 1
(c)
Year 2-10
(d)
Year 1 
(b-c)
Year 2-10 
(b-d)
(dollars per acre)
Landowner A 32 32 32 0 0
Landowner B 31 31 31 0 0
Landowner C 26 26 26 0 0
Landowner D 24 24 24 0 0
Owner-oper. A 56 96 32 39 -24
Owner-oper. B 55 95 32 39 -24
Owner-oper. C 26 77 26 52 0
Owner-oper. D 33 72 24 40 -9
Tenant A 23 64 0 41 -23
Tenant B 22 63 0 41 -22
Tenant C -3 52 0 54 3
Tenant D 7 48 0 41 —7
* See Table 5 and text for assumptions. Components may not sum due to 
rounding.
Source: Calculated from Kenneth L. McReynolds and John R. Schlender,
"Continuous Cropped Winter Wheat in Central Kansas," KSU Farm Manage­
ment Guide MF-574. (Manhattan, Kansas: Kansas State University Coopera­
tive Extension Service), August, 1984 .
The figures presented in Table 6 were used to calculate the 
total net present value of gains over the entire 10 year life of 
the contract. The gains (positive or negative) are based on the 
difference in returns from participating in a long range program 
vs. annual programs under four different scenarios or sets of 
assumptions regarding market prices, loan rates, yields and 
diversion requirements (Table 5). Negative values indicate a net 
loss from shifting to a long-range program. The results of these
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calculations are shown in Table 7. Note that both owner- 
operators and tenants would be worse off, assuming no alternative 
employment opportunities are available, under three of the four 
scenarios. Only if program benefits under annual programs are 
substantially reduced (alternative C) would owner-operators find 
participation in a part-farm retirement program attractive. 
Whole-farm participation would be attractive under both Scenario 
C and Scenario D. With alternative employment opportunities 
available, long-term land retirement becomes even more attractive for both owner-operators and tenants.
Table 7. The Net Present Value of Gains from Participating in A 
10 Year Land Retirement Program under Alternative Assumptions*
Part farm Whole farm
Scenario Participation Participation
(dollars per acre)Off-farm
employment no yes no yes
Owner-operator A -123 -40 -23 60Owner-operator B -121 -38 -21 62Owner-operator C 52 135 152 235Owner-operator D -20 63 80 163
Tenant A -111 -28 -11 72Tenant B -108 -24 -8 76Tenant C 71 154 171 254Tenant D -7 76 93 176
* See Tables 5 and 6 and text for assumptions and source. The 
value of off-farm employment is calculated as 1.8 hours x $6 per 
hour. The gain from part farm participation is calculated as the 
net present value of the difference between annual returns above 
non-land cash crops and the program payment over a ten year term. 
A discount rate of 6 percent is used. The gain from whole-farm 
participation is calculated in the same way except a salvage 
value for machinery of $100 per acre is added to the first year program payment.
The results summarized in Table 7 also suggest that a 10 
year land retirement program would likely appeal to operators on 
marginal land where yields are lower. Both owner-operators and
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tenants with a yield of 25 bushels to the acre (Scenario D) 
rather than 32 would gain from placing all of their land in the 
10-year program regardless of off-farm employment opportunities. 
If off-farm employment opportunities were available, both groups 
would benefit from part-farm participation.
Targeting Long-Range hand Retirement 
to Meet Conservation Objectives
Most of the program guidelines outlined earlier would be 
appropriate for a program targeted to soil conservation. The 
principal change needed is to establish conservation criteria for 
eligible land. While the program provisions assumed are somewhat 
different from those of the 1986 Conservation Reserve, results 
from this part of the study provide a basis for comparing 
programs targeted to conservation and those targeted to least- 
cost production adjustment.
Estimation Procedures
Data from the 1982 National Resources Inventory (NRI) were 
used for the analysis. These data were used to determine the 
proportion of wheat-related land in each district that would be 
eligible for the program based on the two criteria discussed 
below. These proportions were applied to the number of 
wheat-related acres used in the rest of the analysis. Program 
costs were the product of eligible wheat acres, yield levels, and 
district land costs per bushel.
The 2-T Criterion. One possible criterion is to limit 
eligibility for participation in the program to land on which 
estimated erosion exceeds twice the "T" value. T values are 
defined as the "maximum rate of annual soil erosion that may 
occur and still permit a high level of crop productivity to be 
obtained economically and indefinitely" (Wischmier and Smith). 
Acceptable rates of erosion (T-values) vary by soil type and 
area. According to the 1982 NRI, the national average value is 
about 5 tons per acre per year.
Proj ected erosion rates for individual fields or farms can 
be calculated using equations designed for this purpose, namely 
the Universal Soil Loss Equation (USLE) and the Wind Loss 
Equation (WLE). These equations take into account soil proper­
ties, the slope of the land, cropping practices and the presence 
or absence of erosion control measures. The 2 times T (2-T) 
value has been widely discussed as a threshold for targeting 
conservation programs. The 2-T criterion will be referred to as 
criterion #1.
The LCC Criterion. An alternative criterion is to limit 
eligibility to certain land capability classes. The Soil 
Conservation Service classifies land into eight different
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capability classes. Land Class I has few limitations while Land 
Ciass VIII is not suitable for cropping and therefore should be 
planted to grass or trees. Subcategory designations are used to 
represent the dominant production hazard: "e" for susceptibility
to. erosion; "w" for excess moisture; and »s" for stony soil. 
While potentially usable as a basis for targeting eligibility,
land capability classes do not enable one to estimate soil loss directly.
 ^ Using land class as a criterion could exclude some land 
which has a high potential for erosion. For example, erosion 
rates as high as 25 tons per acre have been calculated (based on 
the Universal Soil Loss Equation) for some land falling in 
categories II and III [Ogg, Webb and Huang]. Such categories are 
no*r ??nsic^ ere<^  *-*e land with the most serious erosion problemtherefore are not always targeted by conservation programs 
with limited budgets. Typically, eligibility for conservation 
programs targeted to the most erosive land has been limited to 
some combination of land in Capability Classes Hie, IVe, VI 
II, and VIII. The analysis which follows is based on the 
assumption that only the last four categories would be targeted 
or inclusion in a long-range conservation program. The LCC Criterion will be referred to as criterion #2.
-Tarqetinq Procedure. Wheat-related sampling points from the NRI were examined to see if they met either of the two criteria 
or program eligibility. For each sampling point meeting a 
criterion, an expansion factor was used to estimate the number of 
acres represented by the targeted point. Estimated acreage for 
argeted points was aggregated for each crop reporting district 
based on the two criteria described above. This made it possible 
to estimate the proportion of total wheat-related acres eligible tor participation m  the program based on the two criteria 10
n"LSe^ ° r rtl°nS ffiultiPlied by the district wheat acresed in the rest of the analysis to obtain consistent estimates.
Program Costs. District costs were calculated as the product
Thev-^ eri- = bUShel lalld rental costs, yield, and targeted acres. There is some question as to how much, if any, yields differ on
more erosive land compared to other land. Two yield estimates 
adjustment5^tlInate the levels of program costs and production 
percent Sf'those y S d s !  YleldS estimated earlier a»d 9°
-t-hat- term "wheat related acres" is used to designate acresare growing wheat or are in the fallow portion of a wheat-fallow rotation.
Estimates were based on other criteria as well, including
?eL!bil?tvo Y «eimlich and M llS' bUt SinCe the administrative feasibility of these other criteria was even more open to
question, the results are not reported here. For a more complete
discussion of alternative criteria and their limitations* see Jagger (a), pp. 207-211. ' see
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Fallow Acres. The number of acres in the fallow portion of a 
wheat-fallow rotation (related fallow acres) also was estimated 
because these acres would also need to be included in a conserva­
tion reserve. Possible compensation for these acres was dis­
cussed earlier. Even if no land rent were to be paid for these 
acres, payments to cover maintenance costs might be necessary.
Results
Targeted Acres. The proportion of harvested wheat acres in 
each district that meets each of the two criteria is shown in 
Figure 6. The first figure in each district is the proportion of 
wheat land that would be eligible based on criterion #1; the 
second figure is the proportion that would be eligible based on 
criterion #2. For many districts, there is a substantial 
difference between the two figures, thus indicating that the 
criteria are not internally consistent. For example, in the most 
western district of Montana, only 5 percent of wheat land would 
be eligible under the soil loss criterion, while 42 percent would 
be eligible under the land capability class criterion. The 
ranking is reversed in the two districts just to the east. This 
illustrates the importance of eligibility criterion in deter­
mining where and how much land would be idled under a program 
targeted to conserving soil.
Acres, Costs, and Production Adjustment. Estimates of the 
total acreage of wheat in the Great Plains area that might be 
kept idle, the effect on total wheat production, and the annual 
cost for each of the two criteria are summarized in Table 8. 
Production adjustments were calculated under two sets of assump­
tions : first, the effect on production was estimated assuming 
yields on idle acres were the same as the district average? 
second, the effects were estimated on the assumption that yields 
on the retired acreage were 10 percent less than the district 
average. Under criterion #1, a total of around 12 million acres would be eligible for p a r t i c x p. h" i o r i in the program,, Related 
fallow acres would add another f Million acres to the total. 
Under criterion #2, a much sirial 1 er proportion of all wheat land 
would be eligible and for this reason both the cost and the 
effect on production would be less.
The adjustment in production based on criterion #1, assuming 
yields on targeted acres were 90 percent of the district average, 
would be around 290 million bushels, The annual public cost 
(assuming no tenant or fallow compensation) would amount to about 
$270 million which means that the cost per bushel of retired 
production would average just, under a dollar„
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Figure 6. Percentage of Harvested Wheat Acres Eligible for 
Participation in a Long Range Conservation Reserve
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Table 8 . Program Size and Program Cost of Two Alternative 
Criteria for Retiring Land
Program
Characteristics 
Size and Cost
Criteria for Retiring Land*
Soil Loss 
Equations (#1)*
Land
Class (#2)**
Eligible land
(percent of total acreage)
21.5 14.0
28.0 18.6
Wheat Acres 
Related Fallow Land
Acreage retired 
(million acres)
Wheat Land 11.6
Related Fallow Land 5.2
Average annual cost***
(million dollars)
1.0 x District Yield: 297
0.9 x District Yield: 267
Production adjustment 
(million bushels)
1.0 x District Yield: 320
0.9 x District Yield: 288
7.6
3.4
188
170
207
186
* Eligibility for inclusion in the program is based on land
with potential erosion exceeding 2-T; erosion rates are
calculated using a combination of the universal soil loss
and wind loss equations (USLE + WLE).
** Eligibility limited to land in SCS Capability Classes IVe, 
Vie, VII and VIII.
*** Annual program cost does not include compensation for
related fallow land or payments to tenants.
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Comparing Conservation and Least Cost Programs. A long 
range land retirement program targeted to achieve conservation 
objectives would cost slightly more per unit of reduced output 
than one based on retiring areas with the lowest land cost per 
bushel of wheat production. Assuming 11 million acres were 
retired (the area of land in the Great Plains with an estimated 
erosion rate exceeding the 2-T standard), land retirement costs 
per bushel of supply adjustment would be approximately 10 percent 
higher than for a least-cost supply adj ustment program. While 
total costs are probably underestimated (owing to the omission of 
payments for fallow land), the comparative analysis suggests that 
the incremental cost of attempting to achieve dual obj ectives is not very high.
The effects within the region might be quite different, 
however. For example, under a least-cost program, up to 30 
percent of the wheat land in western Montana might be idled, 
whereas under a targeted conservation program based on the 2-T 
criterion, only 5 percent of the wheat land in northwestern 
Montana would be idled. In contrast, up to 62 percent of the 
wheat land in southeastern Colorado might be retired from 
production based on the conservation criterion. This assumes 
that no limits would be imposed on retiring erodible land.
The foregoing analysis is based solely on wheat-related 
acres. It would be more realistic to assume that all erosive 
cropland would be eligible if a targeted conservation reserve 
program were introduced, not just that devoted to wheat. If so, 
costs would rise which could result in Congress imposing limits 
on either the size of the program or appropriations. Under such 
circumstances, targets for adjusting wheat production might not be achieved.
Factors Limiting the Analysis
Cyop Reporting Districts as Units of Observation. NASS crop 
reporting districts are the smallest units for which data on 
yields and rental rates are available. For acreage and cost 
calculations, it was assumed that land quality and rental rates 
were uniform within districts at the average rate. Districts 
were then ranked on the basis of lowest average land cost per 
unit of output. A fixed proportion (30 percent) of land in each 
of the lowest-cost districts was assumed to enter the program.
The use of average district data is an obvious limitation 
because not all land in a district is of the same quality; rental 
rates also vary within districts. Undoubtedly there is some high- 
cost land and some low-cost land in every district. In practice, 
some land from every district would enter the program, whereas 
the analysis is based on the assumption that only land from the
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lower cost districts is retired. Hence, the geographic distribu­
tion of retired land is likely to differ somewhat from that 
suggested by this analysis. One would expect more accurate 
results concerning the geographic distribution of retired land if 
data were available for units, Such as counties, that are smaller 
than crop reporting districts.
Fixed Proportion of District Acres Retired. The geographic 
distribution of idle land also might differ in practice because 
the foregoing analysis assumes that a fixed proportion of land 
enters the program from each district. In the semi-arid regions 
of the Great Plains, wheat production is more risky and there is 
more marginal land. By assuming the same proportion of land 
enters the program from all low-ranked districts, participation 
may be underestimated for the semi-arid regions and overestimated 
for more favored regions. Restrictions on the acreage that can be 
retired from a local area would limit the underestimation 
problem. To the extent that underestimation exists, costs would 
also be affected because rental rates are lower in the semi-arid 
regions.
Estimates of Cash Rents to Represent Land Rental Rates. 
Another important assumption is that NASS estimates of cash 
rental rates are representative of actual land rental rates. It 
appears that for many districts the NASS estimates are lower than 
prevailing rates based on share rental arrangements. This could 
bias estimates of program costs downward, although the bias from 
using cash rental rates probably does not exceed 10 percent.
Kansas Crop Budgets to Represent Program Impacts. Crop 
budgets from only two areas in Kansas were used to estimate the 
differential impacts on landlords, tenants and owner-operators, 
and only one of them was reported because results were similar. 
Costs and returns may differ for other areas; however, the 
conclusion that tenants would be affected differently from 
landowners and owner-operators by changes in annual program 
provisions is unlikely to be invalidated by further analysis.
Step Functions to Compare Costs of Bid and Offer Systems. 
Estimated cost differentials between a bid and a flat rate offer 
system also need to be qualified. The program supply curves 
(e.g. Figure 1) are step functions. Estimated program costs 
under a flat rate system are sensitive to the vertical height of 
the steps. For a flat rate system, the cost per bushel needed to 
bring the last targeted acre into the program determines the cost 
of every acre brought into the program. Because steps at the 
extremes of the program supply curve are higher than at the mean, 
differences in costs between a bid and a flat rate system depend 
on the target level of adjustment to be achieved. Marginal 
changes in program size may cause large changes in relative costs 
of the two systems.
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'Levels of Non-Land Compensation. The level of non-land 
compensation needed to attract participation in a long range 
program depends on many institutional factors including annual 
commodity program provisions and equity for tenants. An annual 
land payment equal to prevailing cash rents plus a one-time 
payment of twice the annual land payment were assumed to be 
sufficient to attract the desired level of program participation 
as well as to compensate adequately tenants or participating 
owner-operators. True program costs may be higher or lower depending on the validity of these assumptions.
Conclusions
1• Benefits under annual commodity programs will have to be reduced before large numbers of owner-operators would elect to
participate in the proposed long-range program.
One of the major deterrents to successful implementation of 
a low-cost, long-range land retirement scheme is the current 
deficiency payment program which encourages farmers to continue 
producing wheat in order to qualify for the substantial benefits 
now offered. Annual commodity programs will have to be modified 
if large numbers of owner-operators are to be induced to partici- 
pate in the proposed long range program. Under the proposed 
program, landowners receive program land payments equivalent to 
land^ rental rates and operators (tenants or owner-operators) 
receive a one-time payment of twice the annual program land payment.1 1
Returns from participating in annual set-aside programs in 
recent years have exceeded substantially what farmers could earn 
by renting out their land. A long-range program providing 
payments to landowners equivalent to what they can receive by 
renting out their land would appeal mainly to non-operator 
landlords and to owner-operators who want to retire or restruc­ture their farming operations.
A^  substantial reduction in the target price for wheat (assuming the 1986 loan rate is retained) would tip the scales in 
favor of participation in the proposed long range program. If 
land diversion and deficiency payments were eliminated entirely 
and the average market price for wheat remained below $3 per 
bushel, substantial numbers of farm operators would find it 
advantageous to rent land to the government under the proposed ten year contracts.
1 1 The proposed program is more generous than considered in a 
u -s* Department of Agriculture study that assumed only land rent would be paid [U.S.D.A., 1985].
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An alternative to reducing annual commodity program benefits 
is to offer farmers payments higher than those under the proposed 
program. This, of course, would raise the cost of meeting 
whatever adjustment targets might be established. Potential cost 
savings associated with a long-range program probably cannot be 
achieved without some modification of existing support programs.
2. The availability of a long-range land retirement program 
will not solve the financial problems of those heavily in debt 
but might help those with less serious debt who quit farming. 
Reducing annual program benefits would increase the problems of those facing financial stress.
Many farmers with the most serious financial problems have 
land debt higher than can be supported by current returns to 
land. Benefits under the proposed program (which average only 20 
percent higher than land rent over the ten year life of the 
program) would not be sufficient to solve these farmers' prob­lems .
The program might help those owner-operators with less 
serious financial difficulties who have the opportunity to sell 
their equipment and work off the farm. Because the proposed 
program offers a one-time adjustment payment (i.e. tenant 
compensation), farmers who placed their land in the proposed 
program would be better off than those who rented their land to 
other farmers.12
The financial problems of farmers would increase if imple­
mentation of a long-range program were accompanied by a reduction 
in annual program benefits. Reducing the level of deficiency 
payments would place further stress on net farm incomes and might 
result in still lower land values.
3. A long-range land retirement program designed to retire 
wheat land in the Great Plains at minimum cost is not likely to 
have a major impact on soil losses.
Erosion on much of the land now planted to wheat is modest 
and not all of the land subj ect to severe erosion would be 
offered for rent under a voluntary land retirement scheme. If 
instead of seeking to rent land at least cost, the program were 
designed to retire vulnerable crop land, costs would rise, and
12 Obviously, those who are forced to sell or forfeit their 
land would not have this opportunity. A program might allow 
institutions such as the Farmers Home Administration to enter 
land in the program. Tenant compensation payments could then be 
paid to the previous owners or operators, thereby easing the 
transition. Such institutional participation might also help prop 
up land values by withdrawing some land from the market.
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production adjustments would be less for a given expenditure of 
public funds. The marginal cost of incorporating conservation 
objectives may not be very high, but the regional impact of a 
targeted conservation program would differ substantially from 
that aimed at achieving supply adjustments at minimum cost.
4. It will be difficult to design a long-range land retire­
ment scheme in such a wav as to avoid creating inequities between 
regions and tenure groups.
The regional impact of taking land out of production under 
voluntary contracts can, of course, be minimized by restricting 
the acreage idled to a given percentage of the cropland in each 
county. But inevitably there will be different effects on owner- 
operators, tenants and landlords.
Landlords are more likely to participate than owner- 
operators, thus creating fewer opportunities for those seeking to 
rent land. Potential losses to tenants can be reduced by incor­
porating provisions for tenant compensation and restricting the 
amount of rented land entering the program from each district. 
Even with payment of tenant compensation, at 1986 and 1987 annual 
program support levels, many tenants would suffer losses under 
the proposed long-range program unless they could find other land 
to rent. Inequities could be avoided but only at the cost of increasing tenant compensation.
5. Cost reductions that in theory might be achieved bv 
shifting from an annual to a longer-range land retirement program 
may be difficult to realize given political pressures on Congress and USDA administrators.
In designing or modifying future long-run supply management programs, policy makers will be under pressure to distribute 
benefits widely, minimize program impact on local businesses, and 
permit marginal land to qualify for payments. This will make it 
difficult to achieve the cost savings theoretically attainable by 
retiring more land under long-term contracts.
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APPENDIX A
Total Program Cost and Per Acre Costs of a 7.7 Million Acre 
Program Under Alternative Assumptions Regarding Acreage 
Restrictions, Fallow and Tenant Compensation*
Average Annual 
Proaram Cost Production
Percent of 
District 
Acres 25% Fallow Tenant
Total Per Acre Adjustment Retired** Compensation Compensation
(mil.$) ($/A) (mil. bu.)
148 19.16 222 100 no no
170 22.04 232 50 no no
177 22.99 222 100 no yes
178 23.11 225 100 yes no
181 23.51 227 30 no no
183 23.71 218 50 yes no
204 26.45 o o o 50 no yes
207 2 6 e 8 *3 230 30 yes no
214 27.73 225 100 yes yes
217 28.21 227 30 no yes
219 28.45 218 50 yes yes
248 32.22 230 30 yes yes
* Total program cost excludes costs of establishing and
maintaining cover crops and administrative costs«
** Percentage of wheat acreage by cropping practice assumed
retired, from each. d. 1 str 1 ct entering1 th.e jprogfram•
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